How General Can Theories of 'Because' and 'Why' Be?
In this paper, I focus on content, epistemic, and metalinguistic uses of ‘be- cause’.
I argue that the semantic contribution of ‘because’ is the same across the board, with apparent differences in meaning traceable to differences in the explananda of the three types of sentences. My argument goes from com- plementary distribution to an underlying unity. In particular, I adduce evidence for a difference in attachment height, including differences in the ability to appear in certain adjunct constructions, ordering restrictions on stacked ‘because’ clauses, and differential interaction with tense.
In this paper, I focus on content, epistemic, and metalinguistic uses of ‘be- cause’.
- He brought her moss for her terrarium because he likes her.
- He likes her, because he brought her moss for her terrarium.
- What are you doing tonight?—because there’s a movie on.
I argue that the semantic contribution of ‘because’ is the same across the board, with apparent differences in meaning traceable to differences in the explananda of the three types of sentences. My argument goes from com- plementary distribution to an underlying unity. In particular, I adduce evidence for a difference in attachment height, including differences in the ability to appear in certain adjunct constructions, ordering restrictions on stacked ‘because’ clauses, and differential interaction with tense.