Asserting, Presupposing, and Lying
It is widely held that assertion contrasts with presupposition and, in particular, that one cannot assert something by presupposing it. It is equally widely held that lies are assertions: the standard definition of lying entails that a speaker lies just in case she asserts something she believes to be false. Together, these views imply that speakers cannot lie with presuppositions – a view that Andreas Stokke has recently explicitly defended. The aim of this paper is to argue that speakers can, and often do, lie with presuppositions, and to discuss some of the implications this outcome has for current research on assertion, presupposition and lying.
It is widely held that assertion contrasts with presupposition and, in particular, that one cannot assert something by presupposing it. It is equally widely held that lies are assertions: the standard definition of lying entails that a speaker lies just in case she asserts something she believes to be false. Together, these views imply that speakers cannot lie with presuppositions – a view that Andreas Stokke has recently explicitly defended. The aim of this paper is to argue that speakers can, and often do, lie with presuppositions, and to discuss some of the implications this outcome has for current research on assertion, presupposition and lying.