Two Switches in the Theory of Counterfactuals
Based on a truth-value judgment task, we provide evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. As- suming compositionality, this means that the semantic value of these clauses cannot be equated with their truth conditions. We explain this finding based on inquisitive semantics: the relevant antecedents are associated with dif- ferent propositional alternatives, each of which provides a separate coun- terfactual assumption. Second, our results contradict the idea that making counterfactual assumptions always requires minimizing the departure from actuality. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background facts for a given assumption: back- ground facts are held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while foreground facts are discarded.
Based on a truth-value judgment task, we provide evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. As- suming compositionality, this means that the semantic value of these clauses cannot be equated with their truth conditions. We explain this finding based on inquisitive semantics: the relevant antecedents are associated with dif- ferent propositional alternatives, each of which provides a separate coun- terfactual assumption. Second, our results contradict the idea that making counterfactual assumptions always requires minimizing the departure from actuality. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background facts for a given assumption: back- ground facts are held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while foreground facts are discarded.